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RESURRECTING MIRANDA’S RIGHT TO COUNSEL
DAVID ROSSMAN∗

INTRODUCTION
The pedantic policeman’s Miranda warning:
OK. Listen up. I am going to read you your rights. You have the right to
remain silent.1 Anything you say can be used against you.2 You have the
right to an attorney.3 If you can’t afford one, an attorney will be appointed
for you.4
Now that I’ve told you what the Supreme Court says I have to say, let me
tell you what it really means.
That right to silence I told you about, it’s not exactly what it seems. It’s
true that I can’t force you to talk. And it’s certainly true that anything you
say can be used against you. But not much else about it is really what it
seems.
For starters, I can keep asking you questions until you do make a
statement.5 Unless you make it absolutely clear that you want to remain
silent, by words and not by actions, nothing prevents me from keeping it
up and getting you to say something that we can use in court.6 And you
know what, even if you’re absolutely clear about wanting to assert this socalled right to silence, I don’t have to listen to you.7 I can keep on trying to
get you to make a damaging statement, and according to the Supreme
Court, I will have done nothing wrong.8 So long as the prosecutor doesn’t
use the statement itself, I will still be on the right side of the Constitution.
Why would I do that? Because, even though you tried to assert your “right
to silence,” if I ignore you and get you to tell me something that provides
a lead to evidence I can use against you or the name of a person who can

∗ Professor of Law and Director, Criminal Law Clinical Programs, Boston University
School of Law.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id. at 473.
5 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381-82 (2010).
6 Id. at 382.
7 Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 766-67 (2003).
8 Id.
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testify against you, I can build up my case and use what I found in court.9
Plus—and this is the icing on the cake—even if I ignore your clear and
unequivocal statement that you want to remain silent and keep asking
questions that finally gets you to say something useful to me, the jury will
learn about your statement if you take the stand and testify in your own
defense.10
And if you feel a little let down because the right to silence isn’t quite
what it seems, boy, wait until I spell out what the right to an attorney means.
The first thing I want you to know is that, just like with the right to silence,
this so-called right to an attorney won’t even come into play unless you are
unequivocally clear about what you want.11 And even if you have the
presence of mind to come out with that kind of clear statement, I can ignore
what you say, just like with the right to silence.12 Yeah, if I do ignore you
and keep on questioning you, we can use whatever you say if you take the
stand later,13 and we can use any leads you give us to find other evidence
that can be introduced at trial.14
But that’s not the best part about this so-called right to an attorney. Even
if you make one of those clear requests for a lawyer that most suspects find
so hard to make, you will never, ever get an attorney to talk to you as part
of a police interrogation. The best that will happen is that we’ll stop
questioning you, at least until you bring up the topic of our interrogation
again, at which point we can recommence questioning.15 But you won’t get
a lawyer then either. There’s no way any police officer will allow a lawyer
in the interrogation room. Buddy, you are on your own.
Everything in this pedantic policeman’s Miranda warning is an accurate
statement of the law. The Miranda doctrine was the product of the Warren
Court’s lofty and, in hindsight, wildly naïve view that its four-part warning
would make the interrogation process more fair. Since then, Miranda has been
largely gutted at the hands of Justices who did not share their predecessors’
vision of the correct balance between suspects’ rights and police interrogation.
Miranda represented the high-water mark of the criminal procedure
revolution of the 1960s.16 The audacity of its solution to the problem of coerced
police confessions embroiled the Supreme Court in controversy that extended

9

United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-43 (2004).
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980).
11 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
12 Chavez, 538 U.S. at 767.
13 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971).
14 Patane, 542 U.S. at 639-41.
15 Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983).
16 See Mark Tushnet, Observations on the New Revolution in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure, 94 GEO. L.J. 1627, 1627 (2006) (referring to the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure decisions as a “revolution in constitutional criminal procedure”).
10
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for decades. At this point in its history, however, Miranda is bankrupt both
intellectually and in terms of practical effect.
Miranda, by way of what I am sure is unnecessary background, was the
Court’s major effort to establish a proper balance between the need of the police
in obtaining information from a suspect and respect for the suspect’s individual
autonomy in deciding whether to cooperate. Relying on the privilege against
self-incrimination and the controversial assumption that the environment
inherent in police interrogation is so psychologically coercive that a universal
antidote is needed, Miranda announced its controversial prophylactic rule.17
Thus, Miranda requires the police to tell a suspect who is in custody four things
prior to any interrogation: (1) you have a right to remain silent; (2) anything you
say can be used against you; (3) you have the right to the presence of an attorney;
and (4) if you cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for you prior to
any questioning.18
The presence of a defense attorney played a key role in the Miranda Court’s
vision of the interrogation process. “[T]he right to have counsel present at the
interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege
under the system we delineate today.”19 The Court’s reasoning in Miranda
depends on the assumption that a lawyer would actually be present to ensure that
the suspect is protected from making a coerced confession. The Court believed
a lawyer’s presence during interrogation was necessary to give the suspect any
sort of meaningful opportunity to exercise the right to remain silent.20 Without
a lawyer present, the Miranda Court was skeptical of the efficacy of the police
telling suspects that they did not have to answer their questions.21
Having a lawyer present, Chief Justice Warren reasoned, would also serve
other important ends. Just having a lawyer in the room would deter the police
from engaging in questionable tactics that may coerce a suspect into giving an
untrustworthy statement.22 And, if the police did use an improper tactic, it would
much more likely be exposed in court with a lawyer’s testimony than that of a
suspect.23 If a guilty suspect decided to talk, the lawyer could ensure that the

17

See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966) (concluding that “the process of incustody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist,” and that “to combat these
pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination,
the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his rights”).
18 Id. at 444.
19 Id. at 469 (emphasis added).
20 See id. at 470.
21 See id. at 469 (“Our aim is to assure that the individual’s right to choose between silence
and speech remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process. A once-stated warning,
delivered by those who will conduct the interrogation, cannot itself suffice to that end among
those who most require knowledge of their rights.”).
22 Id. at 470.
23 See id.
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statement was fully accurate.24 Finally, an innocent suspect would be in a better
position to show that the police had picked the wrong target if he or she were
assisted by counsel.25
To ensure that lawyers were able to play the role the Court envisioned for
them, the Miranda opinion gave clear directions about what the police had to do
if the suspect asked for a lawyer. The interrogation could go no further until an
attorney was by the suspect’s side.26 The Court did recognize that the police
would not have to have lawyers on call at every police station for the purpose of
advising suspects during interrogation.27 The Miranda Court itself recognized
that, even if a suspect asked for a lawyer, the police could always just terminate
the interrogation.28 But, unless the police were to abandon interrogation as an
investigative technique, the Court left them with the choice of either doing it
with an attorney present or meeting the heavy burden of showing that the suspect
“knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and
his right to retained or appointed counsel.”29 The state could not meet the burden
of showing a waiver simply from the fact that the police eventually obtained a
confession.30
Could the Justices have realistically thought that defense attorneys would
become a routine part of the interrogation process? Certainly, their view of a
defense attorney’s salutary role in the process would have inclined them to think
so:
An attorney may advise his client not to talk to police until he has had an
opportunity to investigate the case, or he may wish to be present with his
client during any police questioning. In doing so an attorney is merely
exercising the good professional judgment he has been taught. This is not
cause for considering the attorney a menace to law enforcement. He is
merely carrying out what he is sworn to do under his oath—to protect to
the extent of his ability the rights of his client. In fulfilling this
responsibility the attorney plays a vital role in the administration of
criminal justice under our Constitution.31
In terms of bringing about a fundamental change in the way that police
conduct interrogations, however, Miranda was almost a dead letter on arrival.
From its inception, no lawyers were ever actually made available to suspects

24

Id.
Id. at 482.
26 Id. at 474.
27 Id.
28 See id. (noting that police may refrain from providing counsel “without violating the
person’s Fifth Amendment privilege so long as they do not question him during that time”).
29 Id. at 475 (citing Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 n.14 (1964)).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 480-81.
25
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subject to police questioning.32 The police, not surprisingly, did not share the
Miranda Court’s opinion of the legitimacy of a lawyer’s role in the interrogation
room.33 The traditional law enforcement view of defense attorneys’ role in the
interrogation process is redolent with salt allusions. “[A]ny lawyer worth his
salt,” Justice Jackson famously said in one such reference, “will tell the suspect
in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any circumstances.”34
Viewing defense attorneys as their mortal enemy, the police went about
implementing Miranda by doing everything in their power to use the one way
out that would still allow interrogation without the presence of counsel. The
warnings had to be given in a way that minimized the chance that the suspect
would actually choose to exercise the right to silence or ask for the help of a
lawyer. Modern studies on Miranda show that about eighty percent of all
suspects agree to talk without a lawyer.35 In my forty-five years as a criminal
trial attorney, the ones who do not are overwhelming either professional
criminals or educated people with money. Neither group is likely to be as
intimidated by the police as those who make up the rest. The poor. The
undereducated. The young. The members of racial and ethnic minority groups
who fear the way the police interact with their community.
Skilled police interrogators do not view the Miranda warnings as much of an
impediment. The typical interrogation takes places in an environment where the
police have total control. Everything that happens is designed to minimize the
importance of the rights contained in the Miranda warnings and the possibility
that the suspect will say something that will cut off the flow of questions. Before
the interrogator gets around to asking about the crime, the conversation often
stays on mundane topics designed to establish rapport and gain trust.36 The idea

32

See Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of Contemporary
Law and Understandings, 90 MINN. L. REV. 781, 797 (2006) (noting that in the vast majority
of cases where a suspect asks for an attorney, no attorney is provided because the police
simply cease the interrogations).
33 See id. at 797-98 (arguing that rather than waste the time securing an attorney for the
suspect, the police will simply cease interrogations because they know that the attorney will
just tell their client to remain silent anyways).
34 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). The value of salt also seems to play a role in how prosecutors describe their role in
keeping lawyers consulting with suspects. In Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945), the
prosecutor in a murder case explained to the jury why the defendant’s confession, given in
response to questioning by an Assistant District Attorney, was voluntary despite the police
refusing to allow the defendant to see the lawyer that he requested: “You want a District
Attorney in this county that is worth his salt, not a powder-puff District Attorney. When you
are trying a case of murder, especially murder of a police officer, you don’t go over and give
him a pat on the back and say, ‘Do you want anything? Do you want to have your lawyer or
your wife or somebody else?’” Id. at 405 n.3.
35 See Godsey, supra note 32, at 792.
36 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey
of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 389 (2007).
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is to “establish a norm of friendly reciprocation.”37 The warnings themselves are
packaged much like the adverse health effects in a pharmaceutical
advertisement, delivered as quickly as possible in a perfunctory way.38 Moving
from the warnings without giving the suspect any time to reflect reinforces an
atmosphere that the suspect has no choice in the matter.39
Miranda does nothing to curtail the sort of police interrogation tactics that are
likely to produce false confessions. It does not prevent the police from
pretending to have independent evidence of the suspect’s guilt, a prevalent
ploy.40 It also does not prevent the police from making suspects believe that they
will face harsher consequences if they do not confess, a tactic that some officers
still admit to using occasionally.41 Where the police do obtain a confession, it is
potent evidence that almost always leads to a conviction. That goes for false
confessions as well.42 As of 2009, of 252 people who have been exonerated by
DNA evidence, 42 had given false confessions.43 All were given Miranda
warnings.44
Miranda has become a safe harbor for the interrogation process that has
displaced any other means of evaluating whether a confession should be
admitted into evidence. In theory, the Due Process Clause still requires
confessions to be voluntary, a doctrine that has traditionally considered whether
the suspect was exercising free will in making the decision to talk to the police.45
But, if the police have given an adequate Miranda warning and have obtained a

37

George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
“Embedded” in Our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 251 (2002).
38 See id. at 250 (“One strategy is to suggest that the warnings are a mere formality to
dispense with prior to questioning, a simple matter of routine, by delivering the warnings
quickly in a perfunctory tone of voice or in a bureaucratic manner.”).
39 See id. at 250-51 (listing strategies used by police interrogators designed “to trivialize
the legal significance of Miranda, create the appearance of a nonadversarial relationship
between the interrogators and the suspect, and communicate that the interrogator expects the
suspect to passively execute the waiver and respond to subsequent questioning”); Kassin et
al., supra note 36, at 383 (“[T]hey may read the rights but then proceed to question suspects
as though they had no choice in the matter, eliciting what some courts have called an ‘implicit
waiver.’” (citation omitted)).
40 See Kassin et al., supra note 36, at 389.
41 See id.
42 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 24 (2009) (stating that in cases where
confessions were proven false, conviction rates ranged from seventy-three to eighty-one
percent).
43 Brandon L. Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1052
(2010).
44 Id. at 1092.
45 See Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110 (1985) (stating that the Court has an independent
obligation to determine whether the confession was “the product of a free and rational will”
and thus “comports with due process”).
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statement that will pass muster under the law that has developed since Miranda,
the confession is almost certainly going to be found to have been voluntary.46
In the years since the Miranda decision, the Court has made it increasingly
easy for police to get a confession that will pass muster. In order to demonstrate
that the suspect understood his rights and declined to exercise them, all the police
must do is show that the suspect understood the language used to deliver the
warnings and afterwards answered questions.47 In order to cut off questioning
by invoking the right to silence or an attorney, the suspect has to make the kind
of clear and unequivocal statement that powerless people in intimidating
circumstances find practically impossible.48 And, if a suspect does indicate that
he or she wants an attorney, subsequently making the most obscure comment on
the topic of the investigation will open the door to the police trying again to get
a statement.49
What is more, in the years since Miranda, subsequent Courts have given the
police a great deal of incentive not even to follow the decision’s relatively tepid
mandate. The Court has held that statements obtained in violation of Miranda
can still be used to impeach a defendant who takes the stand50 or as a lead to
further evidence that will be admissible despite its tainted origin.51 And, in the
final insult to the vitality of Miranda, the Court has held that the police are
generically incapable of violating the privilege against self-incrimination, the
basis for the Miranda warnings in the first place, because the privilege only
prevents the use of a compelled statement as evidence in a criminal trial, not the
act of obtaining the statement.52
The Miranda decision’s vision of the need for defense counsel to make the
interrogation process was not misguided. Leaving the police to deliver the
message that a suspect has rights in the interrogation process simply does not
work. But the Miranda Court was naïve. Given what we know about the way
that defense attorneys conceptualize their role, the police will not allow the
attorneys into the interrogation room. Where that leaves us today is with
Miranda as a fig leaf—it provides cover for those who would avert their eyes

46

See, e.g., Degraffenreid v. McKellar, No. 88-6590, 1989 WL 90569, *2-4 (4th Cir. Aug.
9, 1989) (reasoning that adequate Miranda warnings were sufficient to make the confession
admissible despite the suspect being held incommunicado for five days in solitary
confinement and taken from his cold cell only for questioning).
47 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2011).
48 See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 460-62 (1994) (holding that a suspect’s
statement “Maybe I should talk to a lawyer” was not an unambiguous request for counsel).
49 See Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (stating that a suspect’s
statement “Well, what is going to happen to me now?” was sufficient to allow the police to
reinitiate interrogation of the suspect who had previously asked for an attorney).
50 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
51 See United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-43 (2004).
52 See Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 767 (2003).
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from the naked truth. But anyone with an imagination knows what is really going
on behind closed doors.
What I propose is a modest change in the doctrinal landscape that might
reinvigorate Miranda and produce a fairer balance between police interrogation
and suspects’ rights. It is the sort of proposal that could be adopted by a state
supreme court or legislature. It would entail the following:
1. Police would give the same Miranda warnings that they have always
provided.
2. The police would still operate under the same rules governing the
legitimacy of a suspect’s decision to talk in the absence of an attorney.
In other words, the waiver rules for Miranda rights would not change.
3. If the police obtain a statement from a suspect without the presence of
an attorney, then the jury would be instructed that there is a policy in
the jurisdiction that the police should not interrogate suspects in the
absence of a defense attorney, even with a valid waiver, and that the
jury may take into account in evaluating the credibility of the statement
the fact that the police did not follow this policy.53
4. If the police do provide an attorney for the suspect during
interrogation, then the suspect would be permitted to consult with the
attorney, and the attorney would be given a reasonable opportunity to
advise the suspect during the interrogation.
5. If the suspect does not answer questions that are reasonable for
someone in the suspect’s position at the time to respond to, then that
information would be admissible as substantive evidence of the
suspect’s guilt, subject to a ruling on the probative value of the
suspect’s silence at the time of trial.
6. If the suspect at trial maintains that his or her silence during the
interrogation was based on the advice of the attorney, then that claim
shall constitute a waiver of the attorney-client privilege insofar as it
would otherwise protect the contents of the conversation between the
suspect and the attorney.54

53

Some jurisdictions have mandated jury instructions in other contexts when police
interrogation does not meet a recommended standard. Massachusetts is one such jurisdiction.
See Commonwealth v. DiGiambattista, 813 N.E.2d 516, 533-34 (Mass. 2004) (“[W]hen the
prosecution introduces evidence of a defendant’s confession or statement that is the product
of a custodial interrogation or an interrogation conducted at a place of detention (e.g., a police
station), and there is not at least an audiotape recording of the complete interrogation, the
defendant is entitled (on request) to a jury instruction advising that the State’s highest court
has expressed a preference that such interrogations be recorded whenever practicable, and
cautioning the jury that, because of the absence of any recording of the interrogation in the
case before them, they should weigh evidence of the defendant’s alleged statement with great
caution and care.”).
54 This proposal is very similar to the English practice which provides solicitors for
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The main rationale behind the proposal is pragmatism. It is not politically
feasible to expect any jurisdiction to mandate the introduction of defense
attorneys into the interrogation process without changing the incentives for
attorneys to advise their clients to say absolutely nothing to the police. Nor is it
feasible to expect any change in the current regime that allows police to operate
under the Supreme Court’s current waiver standards. But, giving each side
something that they do not currently get under existing interrogation doctrine
may make this modest change possible. Under this proposal, law enforcement
gets the ability to tell juries in some cases that a suspect refused to answer police
questions, and defense counsel gains the ability to tell juries that the police failed
to follow the jurisdiction’s policy preference for giving suspects a lawyer prior
to interrogation. Defendants, meanwhile, get an actual chance of having a lawyer
present to provide advice during the interrogation process, but only at the cost
of the jury potentially learning of their refusal to cooperate if that is what they
choose.
None of the steps this proposal calls for would require jettisoning any existing
Supreme Court precedent. But one step, offering the possibility of using a
suspect’s refusal to answer as part of the prosecution’s case in chief, is at least
contestable. The Supreme Court has refused on a number of occasions to provide
a direct answer to the closely related question of whether a suspect’s refusal to
answer an incriminating question in an uncounseled, noncustodial interrogation
may be used as substantive evidence.55 In its most recent encounter with this
issue in Salinas v. Texas, the Court found it unnecessary to confront this question
because the suspect had not explicitly asserted a Fifth Amendment privilege, but
simply remained silent.56 One can make, however, a good case that no matter
how the Court answers the question of the use of an uncounseled suspect’s
assertion of the privilege in a noncustodial interrogation, where counsel is
present, the privilege does not stand in the way of the State using the suspect’s
responses whatever they may be.
DOES THE CONSTITUTION PERMIT THE USE OF A COUNSELED SUSPECT’S
SILENCE AS EVIDENCE OF GUILT?
The Miranda decision itself seems to foreclose any proposal to allow the
prosecution to use a suspect’s silence during police interrogation as evidence of
guilt. Chief Justice Warren girded the Miranda warnings with self-incrimination

suspects interrogated by the police and allows the prosecutor to comment on a suspect’s
refusal to answer questions. See Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994, c. 33, §§ 3435 (Eng.) (permitting inferences to be made regarding a suspect’s guilt based on the suspect’s
silence).
55 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013) (addressing only the issue of whether
the express invocation requirement applies to noncustodial police interviews); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232 (1980) (addressing only the issue of whether prearrest silence
can be used to impeach a criminal defendant who chooses to testify).
56 Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184.
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armor designed to protect those who relied on them from any taint in the jury’s
eyes: “In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an
individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police
custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact
that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation.”57 Ten years
later in Doyle v. Ohio,58 the Court reinforced this protection by finding a due
process violation in impeaching a defendant’s trial testimony by evidence that
the defendant remained silent after receiving a Miranda warning.59
Yet, a closer examination of these two barriers reveals that neither is
insurmountable. They each rest on basic premises that would make questionable
their application to the situation of a suspect who remained silent during a
custodial police interrogation where a lawyer was actually present.
The Doyle hurdle is easier to clear, and we will look at it first. The defendants
in Doyle were arrested after selling ten pounds of marijuana to a police
informant.60 They both testified at trial that an aborted transaction took place,
but that they were purchasers not vendors.61 They claimed that the informant had
framed them.62 To impeach this testimony, the prosecutor on cross-examination
brought out the fact that after they had been arrested and had received Miranda
warnings, neither defendant had told this story to the police.63
The Court’s decision in Doyle rested on an estoppel theory and how the
government’s action affected the relevance of the defendant’s silence.64 By not
coming forward with their story, the defendants had done exactly what the police
invited them to do when the police told the defendants they had a right to remain
silent. Because the police’s action in giving the Miranda warning may well have
prompted the defendants to keep their story to themselves, it would be
fundamentally unfair to allow the government to use the defendants’ reliance on
what they were told as evidence of their guilt.65 Moreover, the Court reasoned,
it would be reasonable for anyone hearing the part of the Miranda warning about
the right to remain silent to think that if one took the police up on their word it
would come without any penalty, including the use of silence as impeachment.66
Not only did the Government invite the defendants to keep their story from the
police, but by doing so the Government also robbed the defendants’ silence of a

57

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966) (citations omitted).
426 U.S. 610 (1976).
59 Id. at 618.
60 Id. at 611.
61 Id. at 612-13.
62 Id. at 613.
63 Id. at 613-14. The case also had as one of its more unlikely elements the contention that
the informant mysteriously threw $1320 in cash into the defendants’ car. Id.
64 See id. at 620 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he Court’s due process rationale
has some of the characteristics of an estoppel theory”).
65 See id. at 618.
66 See id.
58
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substantial proportion of the value it would have in contradicting their trial
testimony. Because the police themselves prompted the defendants to fail to tell
them their fantastic story, their silence after being told that they need not say
anything was too ambiguous to support the prosecutor’s attempt to use it as
impeachment material.67
Because the lynchpin of the Doyle doctrine is the police announcement of a
right to remain silent, all one needs to do to avoid its consequence is to have the
police be silent on the topic of silence. Voilà, problem solved. In a world where
Miranda still requires police to give warnings to suspects prior to custodial
interrogation, this insight gives prosecutors a way to impeach defendants with
evidence of their silence only in situations where the defendants were not
entitled to Miranda warnings. One example would be prior to a suspect’s initial
contact with the police, where there simply is no occasion to provide a warning
about the right to silence. This is precisely the context in which the Doyle
problem came to the Court in Jenkins v. Anderson.68
Dennis Jenkins testified in his murder trial that he stabbed the victim in selfdefense.69 He turned himself in to the police two weeks later.70 On crossexamination, the prosecutor brought out the fact that in the interim between the
stabbing and his arrest, the defendant never told the police his exculpatory
version of the events.71 The Court not only found that Jenkins’s two weeks of
silence was probative,72 but that there was nothing unfair about the State’s use
of it to impeach his trial testimony. Because no government action induced
Jenkins to remain silent, the Court held that “the fundamental unfairness present
in Doyle is not present in this case.”73
Jenkins, remember, involved silence prior to a suspect’s contact with the
police. There is another time frame where the police similarly do not have to
give a Miranda warning: after arrest but before any interrogation. The Court
extended Jenkins to just this context in Fletcher v. Weir.74 Eric Weir seemed to
follow the script written by Jenkins. He also got into a knife fight and killed his
adversary.75 He also testified at trial that he acted in self-defense.76 And, he also

67 See id. at 617 (“[E]very post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the
State is required to advise the person arrested.”).
68 447 U.S. 231 (1980).
69 Id. at 232-33.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 233-34.
72 See id. at 239 (“Common law traditionally has allowed witnesses to be impeached by
their previous failure to state a fact in circumstances in which that fact naturally would have
been asserted.” (citing 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1042, at 1056 (Chadbourn rev.
1970))).
73 Id. at 240.
74 455 U.S. 603 (1982).
75 Id. at 603-04.
76 Id. at 603.
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never told the police his version of the events.77 But, unlike Jenkins, Weir was
not only asked on cross-examination why he did not go to the police and report
the killing, but also why he never told the police after he was arrested that he
acted in self-defense.78 Critical to the Court’s resolution of the issue was the fact
that Weir never “received any Miranda warnings during the period in which he
remained silent immediately after his arrest.”79 Absent an affirmative assurance
from the government that Weir could remain silent without any penalty, the
Court saw nothing unfair about using Weir’s postarrest silence to impeach him.80
And, because Weir was not relying on an express invitation to keep his story to
himself, the use of the inconsistency between his silence and his trial testimony
was more reasonable.81
Given the extent to which Miranda warnings have pervaded the national
consciousness through myriad television cop shows and movies, one might
question the soundness of a distinction based on the police telling a suspect
something that probably every American over the age of ten knows by heart.82
Indeed, it is fairly common for defendants to tell their lawyers about their
outrage at the fact that they were not “given their rights.” Now, there is nothing
wrong with police withholding a Miranda warning when they have made an
arrest. Miranda only requires the warning as a predicate to interrogation, and if
the police do not ask questions about the crime, then they do not have to recite
the Miranda rights. But, if one wanted to ensure that even those who did not
receive a Miranda warning were not misled about the consequences of
remaining silent, there is a simple fix to this problem as well. Someone could
simply inform the suspect of the pros and cons of not answering police questions.
And who better to do that than defense counsel?
If a defendant were given access to a lawyer during police questioning in a
regime where one’s silence might be admissible at trial, one of the things the
77

Id. at 603-04.
Compare Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 233 (reciting the cross-examination of the defendant,
which focused on why the defendant had not gone to the police with his version of the events
sooner), with Weir, 455 U.S. at 603 (noting that the in-court statement regarding self-defense
“was the first occasion on which respondent offered an exculpatory version of the stabbing”
and the prosecution cross-examined him as to why he had not advanced his self-defense claim
sooner).
79 Weir, 455 U.S. at 605.
80 Id. at 607 (“In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda
warnings, we do not believe that it violates due process of law for a State to permit crossexamination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand.”).
81 See id. (“A State is entitled, in such situations, to leave to the judge and jury under its
own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which postarrest silence may be deemed
to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”).
82 See State v. Leach, 102 Ohio St. 3d 135, 2004-Ohio-2147, 807 N.E.2d 335, at ¶ 34
(“With the proliferation of movies and television shows portraying the criminal justice
system, it would be difficult to find a person living in America who has not heard of Miranda
warnings.”).
78
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lawyer would do would be to advise the client on precisely this issue. The lawyer
would point out the advantages and disadvantages of cooperating with the
police. And one of the advantages would be avoiding the possibility that the jury
would learn of the client’s refusal to answer questions.
So long as a suspect has not been left with the misconception that remaining
silent carries no penalty, the due process problem that Doyle presents is not
relevant. And a major benefit that lawyers provide for clients is to disabuse them
of misconceptions about the criminal justice system.
However, the barrier to the proposal allowing a suspect’s counseled silence
to be used as evidence based on the privilege is more daunting. The rationale for
the Court’s conclusion, that using a suspect’s silence is an impermissible penalty
on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, does not have any
traction when an attorney is sitting next to a suspect in an interrogation. In order
to see why, let us first examine the rationale for Chief Justice Warren’s statement
in Miranda.
The idea that the State may not penalize people who exercise the privilege by
referring to their silence at trial comes from Griffin v. California,83 the case on
which Miranda relied for this proposition.84 Griffin involved a murder trial
where the defendant did not take the stand.85 Both the prosecutor and the judge,
following a provision in the California Constitution that made it fair game for
both to comment on the failure of the defendant to explain or deny the evidence
against him,86 pointed out that the only surviving witness to the events
surrounding the victim’s death was the defendant who chose not to tell the jury
what had happened.87 The prosecutor and judge’s solemnizing the significance
of the defendant’s failure to take the stand, Griffin held, was “a penalty imposed
by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege
by making its assertion costly.”88

83

380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 468 n.37 (1966).
85 Griffin, 380 U.S. at 609.
86 See id. at 610 n.2 (“Article I, § 13, of the California Constitution provides in part: ‘ . . . in
any criminal case, whether the defendant testifies or not, his failure to explain or to deny by
his testimony any evidence or facts in the case against him may be commented upon by the
court and by counsel, and may be considered by the court or the jury.’”).
87 See id. at 610-11.The trial judge’s instructions to the jury included the following:
As to any evidence or facts against him which the defendant can reasonably be expected
to deny or explain because of facts within his knowledge, if he does not testify or if,
though he does testify, he fails to deny or explain such evidence, the jury may take that
failure into consideration as tending to indicate the truth of such evidence and as
indicating that among the inferences that may be reasonably drawn therefrom those
unfavorable to the defendant are the more probable.
Id. at 610.
88 Id. at 614. The opinion went on to explain: “What the jury may infer, given no help from
the court, is one thing. What it may infer when the court solemnizes the silence of the accused
into evidence against him is quite another.” Id.
84

1142

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1129

The defendants in Griffin and Miranda were both exercising the privilege
against self-incrimination when they remained silent in their respective contexts.
The defendant in Griffin was taking advantage of the special rule concerning the
privilege that applies to a defendant in his or her own criminal trial. A prosecutor
(or a co-defendant if the case is tried jointly) cannot even call the defendant to
the stand.89 The basis for this exception is the negative inference most jurors
would likely draw from the fact that the defendant explicitly refused to answer
the prosecutor’s pointed questions.90 Staying off the stand was precisely what
the privilege allowed Eddie Griffin to do. So asking the jury to draw a negative
inference from that behavior imposed a cost on the exercise of a constitutionally
protected right.
The people who were the objects of the Court’s solicitude in Miranda—
suspects in police custody who are subject to interrogation—are also exercising
a constitutionally protected right. That is because of the Court’s assumption
about the effect of the police-dominated environment in which they find
themselves. “Unless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings,” Chief Justice Warren famously
proclaimed, “no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product
of his free choice.”91 The highly suspect empirical assertion implicit in this
statement and the resulting prophylactic nature of the remedy the Court
prescribed have led to much controversy. But taken on its face, the assumption
about the inherently coercive nature of custodial interrogation means that
suspects in custody do not have to affirmatively assert the privilege to gain its
benefit. If a suspect in police custody makes an incriminating statement in
response to a question, the statement will be excluded at trial on the grounds of
the privilege without a judge looking to see what actually motivated the answer.
By virtue of the Miranda Court’s amateur psychology, compulsion must be
presumed in custodial interrogations.
It should be clear by now why it was natural for the Miranda Court to use the
Griffin principle, which condemned imposing costs on the exercise of the
privilege, as the reason why a prosecutor could not use at trial the fact that a
suspect remained silent in the face of an accusation. Remaining silent during
custodial interrogation is what the privilege allows one to do. If asking the jury
to draw a negative inference from the exercise of the privilege in the context of
refusing to take the stand is prohibited, as in Griffin, then the same negative
inference regarding the exercise of the privilege in the context of police
interrogation should also be prohibited.

89 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1983) (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70, 77 (1973)).
90 Cf. Namet v. United States, 373 U.S. 179, 185-88 (1963) (discussing the probability that
jurors would draw a negative inference from the fact that prosecution witnesses claimed the
privilege on cross-examination to questions about their participation in criminal conduct
together with the defendant).
91 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458 (1966).
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This equation changes, however, when the interrogation takes place in the
presence of an attorney. The Miranda Court’s underlying psychological
assumption about the pressure a suspect faces in a police-dominated
environment no longer fits. It would be disingenuous to conclude that the
presence of the very antidote to police pressure, a defense attorney, did not
remove the coercion that custodial police interrogation would otherwise entail.
In short, when a suspect with a lawyer present remains silent at a custodial
interrogation, one cannot conclude by virtue of Miranda’s logic that the silence
represents an exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination. It is a different
kind of silence. Which leads us to the next question we must confront: Does
every act of silence in the face of police questioning entail an exercise of the
privilege against self-incrimination?
Not every person who remains silent is doing something the Constitution
protects. Silence is a funny sort of right. Of course, we all have the power within
us to remain silent whenever we want. So to say we have a right to silence clearly
cannot mean that the Constitution guarantees us the ability to do something we
otherwise could not do, like vote. We cannot vote without some affirmative act
on the part of the government allowing us to engage in the act of voting. We do
not need the government to do anything like that to allow us to remain silent. So
clearly, what a right to silence must mean is that if we remain silent under some,
or all, circumstances, we not only have the power to do so but also have a
normative claim that it is proper to do so. And, having a normative claim against
the State to exercise a right means that the State is under a corresponding duty
not simply to allow us to exercise that right, but to avoid interfering with us
when we do.92
That is where the concept of compulsion comes into play. What the privilege
gives us is not a generalized right granted to us by the State to remain silent, but
a right to have the State not use compulsion to get us to give up our power to
exercise silence. If you think you have a generalized right to remain silent that
governs all of your interactions with government officials, try it out. When you
are appointed to the federal bench and a future colleague administers the oath
asking you to swear to uphold the Constitution, remain silent and see what
happens. Even if your silence was based on a fear that anything you said in
response to the oath would require you to admit your commitment to the violent
overthrow of the government (which we can assume under some circumstances
would be an incriminating statement), I would not count on your chances of
convincing anyone you were entitled to the job because of the privilege against
self-incrimination.
The language of the privilege rings the bell of compulsion, not silence. It
guarantees only that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a

92

See Alf Ross, Tû-Tû, 70 HARV. L. REV. 812, 817-18 (1957) (discussing how the word
“rights” is a conclusory term for expressing the normative judgment that a particular person
in a particular setting is entitled to do or receive a particular thing).
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witness against himself.”93 The Court has consistently adhered to, and
sometimes quoted, the view of Leonard Levy about this aspect of the privilege:
“The element of compulsion or involuntariness was always an ingredient of the
right and, before the right existed, of protests against incriminating
interrogatories.”94 Miranda did not require police to tell a suspect that you have
“the right to remain silent”95 because that is an accurate general description of
what the privilege provides. It required police to give suspects this information
because the suspects were going to be questioned in an environment where the
Court concluded compulsion was an inherent part of the environment. That is
why the Chief Justice does not warn the incoming President of a right to silence
before administering the oath of office. Nor does a police officer have to give
you a Miranda warning unless you are in custody, because it is only when
suspects are in a custodial environment that the Court is willing to presume that
suspects cannot resist police compulsion to answer questions.96
Justice Stevens was the foremost proponent of this view of the privilege. He
explained his position in Jenkins, in which he concluded “the privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is simply irrelevant to a citizen’s decision to
remain silent when he is under no official compulsion to speak.”97 Where a
defendant remained silent at his trial, Justice Stevens understood that an exercise
of the privilege was involved.98 But in the prearrest context where the suspect is
under no official compulsion to speak or remain silent, a voluntary decision to
do one or the other does not raise any issue under the privilege.99 That being the

93

U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 562 (1983) (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY,
ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 328 (1968)); see also Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of
N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 57 n.6 (1964) (“The constitutional privilege against selfincrimination has two primary interrelated facets: The Government may not use compulsion
to elicit self-incriminating statements; and the Government may not permit the use in a
criminal trial of self-incriminating statements elicited by compulsion.” (emphasis added)
(citations omitted)).
95 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468.
96 See, e.g., Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 437-42 (1984) (framing the issue of
custody in the case as “whether a traffic stop exerts upon a detained person pressures that
sufficiently impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that
he be warned of his constitutional rights” and concluding that a traffic stop did not constitute
custody under this formulation).
97 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 232-33 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
98 Id. at 242.
99 Id. at 243-44. Justice Stevens’s concurrence did contain language that some have
maintained strip it of any support for its application to the situation where the suspect is
represented by counsel during police interrogation. See State v. Borg, 806 N.W.2d 535, 55455 (Minn. 2011) (Meyer, J., dissenting) (“Justice Stevens’ opinion is clearly tied to the facts
of that case, in which the defendant’s silence came before any contact with the police.”).
Distinguishing the prearrest context presented by the facts in Jenkins from a trial where a
94
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case, if a defendant’s silence was otherwise probative, a prosecutor could
introduce it at trial either for impeachment or as substantive evidence of guilt.100
There is, however, one small problem with Justice Stevens’s explanation. He
essentially hid the rabbit he pulled out of the hat by assuming that there is no
official compulsion to speak if remaining silent means that the prosecutor can
use your silence to impeach you should you be charged with a crime and take
the stand in your own defense. He never addressed the question of whether the
threat of using one’s silence is, itself, prohibited under the privilege. There are
consequences that the State may not attach to a person’s decision not to reveal
potentially incriminating information. The paradigmatic historical example is
putting someone behind bars for contempt.101 If the state put someone in the
defendant remains silent, Justice Stevens stated: “The fact that a citizen has a constitutional
right to remain silent when he is questioned has no bearing on the probative significance of
his silence before he has any contact with the police.” Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). The reference to a right to remain silent when questioned has to be understood
in the context of the discussion which preceded it, and that discussion concerned the
application of the privilege at trial and not a general right to silence whenever faced with a
question. See id. at 242. Indeed, Justice Stevens went on to say: “[I]n determining whether
the privilege is applicable, the question is whether petitioner was in a position to have his
testimony compelled and then asserted his privilege, not simply whether he was silent. A
different view ignores the clear words of the Fifth Amendment.” Id. at 244. The logic of
Justice Stevens’s position applies whether someone has been arrested or not. Because Jenkins
only presented the Court with the problem of how to apply the privilege to someone who had
not yet been arrested, there was no reason for Justice Stevens to opine about how the issue
should be resolved in other contexts. Thus, it is a very shaky leap from his reference to the
significance of silence before contact with the police to the conclusion that the analysis would
be different afterwards.
100 Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 244 n.7 (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Under my approach, assuming
relevance, the evidence could have been used not only for impeachment but also in rebuttal
even had petitioner not taken the stand.”).
101 See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 256-57 (1983) (“[A] District Court cannot
compel Conboy to answer deposition questions over a valid assertion of his Fifth Amendment
right, absent a duly authorized assurance of immunity at the time.”). The list of other
government sanctions that may not be attached to an individual’s silence contains:
 The imposition of the loss of a government benefit, such as a job or a license to engage
in a profession. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 807-08 (1977)
(addressing loss of position as a political party official); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S.
70, 83 (1973) (addressing loss of eligibility as a public contractor); Garrity v. New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967) (addressing loss of employment as a police officer).
 The revocation of probation. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984)
(stating in dicta that “if the State . . . asserts that invocation of the privilege would lead
to revocation of probation, it would have created the classic penalty situation, the
failure to assert the privilege would be excused, and the probationer’s answers would
be deemed compelled and inadmissible in a criminal prosecution”).
 A criminal sanction for failing to provide information outside of trial context where
the information provides definitive evidence of guilt. See Marchetti v. United States,
390 U.S. 39, 61 (1968) (holding that the privilege protects a taxpayer who refuses to
file a gambling tax return or register as a gambler, because the information in those
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position of either making a potentially incriminating statement or going to jail,
the privilege would not be “simply irrelevant” because there would be
compulsion involved. Justice Stevens never explained why the same cannot be
said when the State places people in the position of either making a potentially
incriminating statement or having their silence used to impeach them.
It turns out that the majority in Jenkins did address this problem, although not
in an altogether straightforward way. In fact, the majority expressly noted it was
not deciding the application of the privilege to prearrest silence.102 But it did
provide some support for the proposition that silence where one is not under any
other type of compulsion to answer is fair game for the prosecutor at trial.103 The
majority in Jenkins instead disposed of the privilege question on waiver grounds.
The Court reasoned that even if the defendant’s prearrest silence were an
invocation of the privilege, by taking the stand and testifying the defendant
waived his right to keep that fact from the jury.104 In reaching this result, the
majority applied a waiver rule announced in the 1926 case of Raffel v. United
States.105 An examination of Raffel suggests a way of viewing waiver that would
allow the prosecution to use a counselled defendant’s silence during
interrogation as substantive evidence at trial.
Raffel involved a defendant whose first trial ended with a hung jury.106 He
was retried and convicted. At both trials, a prohibition agent testified that the
defendant admitted to owning the speakeasy where the liquor was found.107
Before the first jury, the defendant did not take the stand.108 At the second trial,
the defendant did testify and denied making the admission to the prohibition

forms would incriminate him).
 The use of an exercise of the privilege at trial as substantive evidence. See Griffin v.
California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965) (holding that the Fifth Amendment “forbids
either comment by the prosecution on the accused’s silence or instructions by the court
that such silence is evidence of guilt”).
 The automatic imposition of a quasicriminal sanction. See Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 634, 637-38 (1886) (addressing forfeiture of goods).
102 See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 n.2 (“Our decision today does not consider whether or
under what circumstances prearrest silence may be protected by the Fifth Amendment.”).
103 See id. at 240 (“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent
before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and
given Miranda warnings. . . . We hold that impeachment by use of prearrest silence does not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
104 See id. at 235 (“[T]he immunity from giving testimony is one which the defendant may
waive by offering himself as a witness. . . . When he takes the stand in his own behalf, he does
so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be crossexamined . . . .” (quoting Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 496-97 (1926))).
105 Id.
106 Raffel, 271 U.S. at 495.
107 Id.
108 Id.
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agent.109 On cross-examination, the prosecutor brought out the fact that at the
previous trial the defendant chose not to testify.110 The Raffel Court viewed the
problem through the lens of the general rule that when a defendant takes the
stand he or she must answer all the prosecutor’s relevant questions.111 The
defendant, in other words, cannot claim the privilege on cross-examination.112
But the Court was not completely blind to the tension between the general rule
and the special case where the relevant question concerns a prior invocation of
the privilege.113
In a brief discussion that in some ways foreshadowed the Griffin concept of a
cost on the exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination, Raffel considered
whether the prosecutor’s comment in the second trial could have impermissibly
burdened the defendant’s choice to remain silent at the first.114 The explanation
the Court gave tells us why use of a prior invocation of the privilege for
impeachment may not be the type of compulsion the privilege prohibits.
The Raffel Court recognized that a defendant’s decision to exercise the
privilege and stay off the stand is made more difficult if he or she must factor in
the possibility of some future prosecutor using that fact on cross-examination.115
But the Court found no significant difference between this amount of pressure
and the inevitable cost of remaining silent inherent in any trial. If a defendant
chooses not to testify, there is always the possibility that the jury, despite an
instruction to the contrary, will draw a negative inference from the defendant’s
choice.116 Even if the privilege prevented cross-examination on a prior
invocation, there would still be pressure on a defendant to testify arising from
the defendant’s calculation of how the jury would react if there were a second
trial.117 In essence, the Raffel Court determined that allowing the prosecutor to
use a prior invocation imposed only an insignificant cost on the exercise of the
109

Id.
Id. The cross-examination also gave the defendant an opportunity to explain why he
chose not to testify, which the defendant did, saying that he did not see a reason to testify
before because he thought the evidence against him was not strong enough to convict. Id.
111 See id. at 497.
112 See Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958) (discussing how the decision
to testify constitutes a waiver of the privilege with respect to the subject matter of the
testimony and the scope of the “waiver is determined by the scope of relevant crossexamination”).
113 See Raffel, 271 U.S. at 497. The Court conceded, without deciding, that if the defendant
had not taken the stand, his prior invocation of the privilege would not have been admissible.
Id. But, it explained this result on the ground that this type of evidence would lack any
probative value, not on the basis of any policy behind the privilege. Id.
114 See id. at 498-99.
115 See id. What a defendant must take into account is the convergence of three future
events: (1) the current proceeding ending in a mistrial, (2) the case being retried, and (3) the
defendant making the decision to testify in the second trial.
116 See id. at 499.
117 See id.
110
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privilege. “We are unable to see that the rule that if he testifies, he must testify
fully, adds in any substantial manner to the inescapable embarrassment which
the accused must experience in determining whether he shall testify or not.”118
What we learn from Raffel, therefore, is that not every detriment associated with
remaining silent is forbidden. Silence has its own inherent costs and only if the
State substantially adds to that baseline does the privilege stand in the way.
The Jenkins majority could have just cited Raffel and stopped there to support
its conclusion that the defendant’s decision to take the stand waived any
privilege against self-incrimination. But it didn’t. The opinion went on to use the
Raffel analysis and compare other situations to the type of pressure that the use
of silence for impeachment imposes.119
In the years after Raffel, the Court considered a number of additional contexts
where the defendant’s choice to remain silent comes at a price. The Jenkins
majority relied on two particular contexts. One had to do with capital murder
cases featured in the Court’s joint decision in McGautha v. California.120 In
some jurisdictions, defendants charged with capital murder have the same jury
decide both the question of guilt and the question of whether to impose the death
penalty in a unitary trial. Defendants in this situation are faced with a similar
choice to the defendant in Jenkins. Defendants in a Jenkins context must weigh
remaining silent against the prospect of being impeached if they testify.
Defendants in a McGautha context must weigh remaining silent on the question
of guilt against the lost opportunity to present through their own testimony
mitigating information on the issue of sentencing.
In McGautha, the Court held that “the policies of the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination are not offended when a defendant in a capital case
yields to the pressure to testify on the issue of punishment at the risk of damaging
his case on guilt.”121 Even considering “the peculiar poignancy of the position
of a man whose life is at stake,”122 the Court held that the state may make the
price of silence the loss of an opportunity personally to plead one’s case on the
issue of punishment. That establishes another benchmark against which to
measure the effect of using otherwise noncompelled silence as substantive
evidence of guilt.
Jenkins also held out another example of a permissible type of pressure a state
may bring to bear on someone who refuses to make an incriminating statement:
plea-bargaining. As authority for the proposition that not every type of pressure
to abandon a constitutional right is invalid, Jenkins cited Corbitt v. New

118
119
120
121
122

Id.
Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1980).
See id. at 236 n.3 (discussing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)).
McGautha, 402 U.S. at 217.
Id. at 216.
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Jersey,123 which upheld a statute that rewarded defendants who pled guilty with
immunity from the maximum sentence for the crime of murder.124
Think about what is involved in a guilty plea. It is the paramount exercise of
self-incrimination. By contrast, the entry of a plea of not guilty is a constitutive
act of invoking the privilege. And so, at bottom, plea bargaining is all about the
use of state power to get the defendant to abandon the privilege and incriminate
himself. Corbitt, and the earlier guilty plea cases on which it relied,125 made it
legitimate for the state to make a defendant bear the risk of receiving a harsher
sentence if the defendant refused an offer to plead guilty.126 Corbitt noted that
the Court had retreated from the high water mark of the Griffin principle
prohibiting a cost on the exercise of the privilege. “[N]ot every burden on the
exercise of a constitutional right,” the Court noted, “and not every pressure or
encouragement to waive such a right, is invalid.”127
The plea-bargaining cases set another benchmark. If the State may force a
defendant who exercises the privilege to bear the risk that the defendant may
receive a sentence drastically more severe, does it exceed “in any substantial
manner,” to use the test from Raffel, the burden of having one’s counseled
silence used as substantive evidence?128
There are other contexts in which the Court has been called upon to establish
the permissible limits on how the state may react to someone’s silence. Let us
take a look at them and see how they compare to the proposal at hand.
The Court has addressed the evidentiary use of silence, aside from the
impeachment context that Jenkins considered. In Baxter v. Palmigiano129 the
Court dealt with whether a prison disciplinary hearing could draw an adverse
inference from a prisoner remaining silent during the process.130 The Court held
that nothing in the Constitution prevented the state’s use of someone’s silence
as evidence in a non-criminal case.131 Several aspects of the prison disciplinary

123

Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 236 (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 220 (1978)).
Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 220.
125 See id. (discussing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), and Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)).
126 In Brady, the Court upheld a guilty plea that the defendant entered that ensured a
lengthy prison sentence rather than the defendant going to trial and facing the prospect of the
death penalty. Brady, 397 U.S. at 744-45. In Bordenkircher, the Court upheld a life sentence
after the defendant was convicted following his refusal of a plea offer that would have entailed
only five years in prison. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 366. And in Corbitt, the defendant went
to trial and received a mandatory life sentence rather than enter a guilty plea which would
have made him eligible for a term of not more than thirty years. Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 212, 216.
127 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 218.
128 Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 499 (1926).
129 425 U.S. 308, 310 (1976).
130 Id.
131 Id. at 320. The stakes at issue in Baxter involved a term of thirty days in “punitive
segregation” and a downgrade in his classification status. See id. at 312-13.
124
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proceedings it considered led the Court to conclude that drawing an adverse
inference did not contravene the privilege.132 First, and the most crucial, was that
the hearing in which the inference played a role was not a criminal case.133 The
long-standing rule applying the privilege in civil cases is that a party may claim
the privilege but may not escape an adverse inference from refusing to answer a
question.134 In civil cases, where the stakes are not as high and where the
condemnation that accompanies conviction of a crime is not at issue, a Griffin
rule is unnecessary.135 Second, the Court in Baxter relied on the fact that the
inmate’s silence did not automatically result in the imposition of the disciplinary
sanction.136 It would just form part of the entire record and be given whatever
weight its probative value commanded.137 This second factor distinguished
Baxter from a line of cases dealing with situations in which individuals who
refused to answer potentially incriminating questions outside the context of a
criminal trial were automatically subject to the loss of some government benefit.
In the first of the automatic penalty cases, Garrity v. New Jersey,138 police
officers suspected of criminal activity by their superiors were questioned by the
Attorney General’s Office.139 The interrogation proceeded under the terms of a
statute that provided that any public employee who refused to answer questions
based on the privilege “upon matters relating to the . . . employment . . . shall
thereby forfeit his . . . employment.”140 The Court held that the threat of being
fired constituted “a form of compulsion,” and thus the privilege prevented the
use of the statements the officers made at their subsequent criminal trial.141 In
explaining its result, the Court compared what happens when a state puts public
employees to the choice between self-incrimination or loss of their livelihood to
the plight facing suspects undergoing police custodial interrogation.142 In both
situations, the Court reasoned, the context in which the state has placed the
person it wants to question “is ‘likely to exert such pressure upon an individual
as to disable him from making a free and rational choice.’”143 This sweeping
generalization may be questionable psychology, in the Miranda context as well
as in Garrity. But, it does give us a way to identify what Fifth Amendment
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134 Id. at 318 (citing 8 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2272, at 439 (McNaughton rev.
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135 Id. at 319.
136 Id. at 331.
137 Id. at 317-18.
138 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
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compulsion means. The state may not force someone to choose between selfincrimination and the automatic loss of something as important to them as their
job. The immediacy and magnitude of the consequence are necessary
ingredients.
The other automatic penalty cases the Court noted in Baxter all followed this
pattern.144 For example, in Lefkowitz v. Turley,145 architects who claimed the
privilege before a grand jury were automatically disqualified from government
contracts.146 The Court held that the New York statute that imposed this
consequence violated the privilege, because the “threat of substantial economic
sanction” constituted compulsion just as would the threat of imprisonment for
contempt.147
The state’s use of a person’s silence in the face of a government accusation
also played a role in Brogan v. United States.148 Brogan addressed the validity
of the “exculpatory no” defense to a charge of making false statements.149 An
“exculpatory no” means that if someone makes a simple denial of an accusation
of wrongdoing to a federal agent, it is not a violation of the statute that makes it
a crime to make a materially false representation to a federal agency on a matter
within their jurisdiction.150 One of the arguments in support of the “exculpatory
no” defense was based on a common metaphor found in the jurisprudence of the
privilege: the “cruel trilemma.”151
The trilemma is essentially a three sided catch-22.152 The phrase, as applied
to the privilege, originated in Justice Goldberg’s opinion in Murphy v.
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Baxter also relied on the companion cases of Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 273
(1968), and Uniformed Sanitation Men Assn. v. Comm’r of Sanitation, 392 U.S. 280 (1968).
Baxter, 425 U.S. at 329-30. In Gardner, the Court held that New York City could not fire a
police officer solely because he asserted the privilege and refused to answer questions before
a grand jury. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278-79. The Court held that the “penalty of the loss of
employment” constituted coercion. Id. at 279. In Sanitation Men, which also involved city
employees who refused to testify before a grand jury and were fired solely for that reason, the
result was the same. Sanitation Men, 392 U.S. at 284 (applying Gardner).
145 414 U.S. 70 (1973).
146 Id. at 71-73.
147 Id. at 82; see also Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 (1984) (finding it would
violate the privilege for a state automatically to revoke probation of a probationer who refused
to answer incriminating questions put to him by a probation officer in a noncustodial setting);
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (finding a Fifth Amendment violation where
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148 522 U.S. 398, 399 (1998).
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150 Id. at 401; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2012) (outlining the crime of false representation
to a federal agency).
151 Id. at 404.
152 See generally JOSEPH HELLER, CATCH-22 (1961) (illustrating a set of paradoxical
requirements whereby airmen mentally unfit to fly did not have to do so, but could not actually
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Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor,153 where he used it to explain the
plight of a witness testifying in front of a tribunal with contempt power.154 The
“cruel trilemma” that required the protection of the privilege consisted of three
unpalatable options: “self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”155
It is easy to see how the trilemma applies to the paradigmatic example of the
privilege: the situation of a grand jury witness asked an incriminating question.
If the witness answered truthfully, then she has provided inculpatory testimonial
evidence to the prosecutor, which is precisely the type of result the privilege is
designed to prevent. If the witness lies, then she exposes herself to prosecution
for perjury. And if the witness remains silent, she will be jailed for contempt.
The solution to the trilemma is to give its victim the right to remain silent without
the possibility of going to jail for contempt, thus avoiding each of its perils.
In Brogan, the petitioner, a union official, met with agents from the IRS and
the Department of Labor and falsely said “no” to a question about whether he
had received any money from an employer for whom his union members
worked.156 The conundrum that the union official said he faced when he
contemplated his answer was the equivalent of the trilemma.157 If he answered
the question truthfully, he would incriminate himself. If he lied, he would be
subjecting himself to jail for committing perjury. And silence, he contended, was
not a viable choice because anyone in his situation would fear that the act of
remaining silent would be used against him in the future.158 The only solution
that would allow him to avoid the perils of the trilemma, he maintained, was to
give him the option of an “exculpatory no.” Justice Scalia’s response was telling.
“It is well established that the fact that a person’s silence can be used against
him—either as substantive evidence of guilt or to impeach him if he takes the
stand—does not exert a form of pressure that exonerates an otherwise unlawful
lie.”159
Now, we can circle back to the proposal that would allow a prosecutor the
right to use as evidence a defendant’s assertion of the privilege at an
interrogation where counsel was present. Is the threat of the use of a suspect’s
silence the type of pressure that meets the definition of compulsion that the
privilege prohibits? The concept of a baseline is helpful in unpacking this
question.

be excused).
153 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
154 Id. at 54 (“[A]bsent an immunity provision, one jurisdiction in our federal structure
may compel a witness to give testimony which might incriminate him under the laws of
another jurisdiction.”).
155 Id. at 55.
156 Brogan, 522 U.S. at 399.
157 Id. at 404.
158 Id. at 405.
159 Id. (emphasis added).
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The ordinary course of everyday life sometimes presents people with an
awkward choice of either admitting something embarrassing or remaining silent.
This dilemma may even be freighted with an accusation of criminality. Consider
a conversation between a man and a woman after a night of drinking that
culminated in a sexual encounter. Let’s call them Alice and Ted. Alice calls Ted
the next morning and says: “Oh Ted. How could you? You knew I had too much
to drink last night. You knew I couldn’t give any type of real consent. What you
did was rape, wasn’t it?” Ted is in the position of facing an accusation of a
serious crime. Let’s say he remains silent; hangs up the phone, in fact. Would
there be anything in this encounter that would conceivably give Ted the right to
prevent on the grounds of the privilege some future prosecutor from introducing
this exchange into evidence as proof of Ted’s guilty knowledge? Ted may say
that he was exercising his generalized right to silence by his response to Alice’s
accusation. But it hardly seems likely that the Fifth Amendment privilege was
adopted in order to overturn the established common law rule that silence in the
face of an accusation is probative evidence.160 The Constitution was not adopted
to regulate the ordinary rules of conversation between ordinary citizens, even
when it contains grave accusations. It may be that the rules of evidence would
not allow the use of Ted’s silence in this situation, but the privilege against selfincrimination would not play a role in the analysis.
Now, one might say that because Ted did not explicitly assert the privilege on
hearing Alice’s accusation, there’s an independent reason why it would not play
a role in any future criminal trial. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Salinas stands for just this proposition.161 But a simple change in the scenario
would allow Ted to avoid being caught on the horns of Salinas. Instead of
remaining silent when Alice finished her accusation, he simply could have said
“Well, Alice, I’ll take the Fifth on that one.” That simple, though inelegant,
statement would be enough to invoke the protection of the privilege if it
otherwise applied.162 But it would not make Ted’s claim any more grounded in
the Constitution. You cannot cloak yourself in the mantle of the privilege just
because you would like its protection. You cannot prevent your employer from
firing you, for example, if you refuse to answer a question about why your
expense account lists $25,000 worth of charges for an escort service. In order to
prevent yourself from suffering an adverse consequence because you have
refused to answer a potentially incriminating question, you have to find yourself
in a situation to which the privilege is directed. Interactions between private
employers and their employees do not count and neither do conversations
between ordinary people. These interactions do not present the sort of danger
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For the history of the evidentiary doctrine that a tacit admission is admissible as
evidence of guilt, see generally Frank R. Herrmann & Brownlow M. Speer, Standing Mute at
Arrest as Evidence of Guilt: The “Right to Silence” Under Attack, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2007).
161 See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180-83 (2013).
162 See Anderson v. Terhune, 516 F.3d 781, 783 (9th Cir. 2008) (recognizing that “I’ll take
the Fifth” is synonymous with asserting the privilege against self-incrimination).
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that led to the adoption of the privilege. The state is not using its monopoly on
the use of coercive instruments of power to force individuals to reveal
incriminating information.
If the interaction between Alice and Ted does, as I contend, establish a base
line from which the state may avoid any barrier to the use of Ted’s purported
shield of the privilege, consider how, if at all, the situation would change if Alice
first went to the police. It would be a relatively conventional investigative
technique in that situation for the police to ask Alice to call Ted on the telephone
and try to get an admission from him that he had sex with her when she was too
intoxicated to consent. The conversation might, in fact, proceed exactly as
before, with Ted responding that he wants to “take the Fifth.” Two things are
clear from this new scenario. One is that now Alice is no longer just acting as an
ordinary citizen. She is, effectively, an agent of the State. And the other is that
from Ted’s point of view, nothing has changed. If he was in a situation before
that did not present him with the sort of compulsion that the privilege is designed
to prevent the state from using to obtain an incriminating statement, he must be
just as unencumbered in the second scenario.
Would the privilege prevent the state from using Ted’s comment if Alice were
working as a police agent? Would the pressure on Ted to respond, rise to the
level of coercion under the privilege? Comparing it to the baseline context where
Alice is just an ordinary citizen, the answer is no. The situations are essentially
the same. Ted feels no more pressure to talk than is inevitable as an ordinary
consequence of social life.
There is another aspect of Ted’s situation that also points in the direction of
the conclusion that he does not fall within the ambit of the privilege. The
prospect that the potential cost he faces—the substantive use of his response at
a future criminal trial—is by no means automatic. It depends on a number of
contingencies: whether he is charged with a crime and whether a judge would
allow the prosecutor to introduce Ted’s response into evidence in the face of a
challenge based on the rules of evidence.163 We have seen that the immediacy
of the penalty plays a key role in the analysis of whether it constitutes the sort
of compulsions that the privilege prohibits. It is not part of the picture for Ted.
Would the future use of a suspect’s silence be sufficiently coercive to rise to
the level of compulsion that the privilege prevents if the suspect made his or her
choice in a police interrogation where counsel was present? Let us look at the
features of the environment where this question would arise. First of all, we have
seen that no one can insulate himself or herself from the pressure of having to
face the possibility of seeing a refusal to respond to an accusation of wrongdoing
be used in some future criminal trial. It is a fact of social life that the privilege
does not alter. Whether you are talking to your employer or someone who thinks
he or she is a victim of a crime you committed, you cannot escape the possibility
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that your refusal to respond to an accusation will find itself as part of some
prosecutor’s case in chief. Some pressure to respond is part of everyone’s
baseline.
Second, it would no longer be appropriate to apply the Miranda presumption
that the suspect was in an inherently coercive environment. The very presence
of counsel would dispel the pressure that the police would otherwise bring to
bear. The Court’s conclusion that compulsion was inherent in custodial
interrogation specifically relies on the absence of counsel as a necessary
ingredient. “The presence of counsel, in all the cases before us today, would be
the adequate protective device necessary to make the process of police
interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. His presence would insure
that statements made in the government-established atmosphere are not the
product of compulsion.”164
Third, the pressure facing the suspect to make a statement, which comes from
the potential future evidentiary use of a refusal to answer, is by no means
automatic. It may or may not come to pass.
And, fourth, as in the plea-bargaining context, the suspect is not left to his or
her own devices in making the decision about how to weigh the choice to speak
or remain silent. With the assistance of counsel, while the decision may not be
an easy one, it is likely to be a thoughtful, considered choice.
These four features of an interrogation where the suspect was actually given
the assistance of counsel make it difficult to conclude that the type of
compulsion that the privilege was designed to prevent is actually present. A
prosecutor’s use of the suspect’s silence as part of the government’s case in chief
would not be imposing a cost of the exercise of the privilege because the act of
silence would not have taken place in an environment where government
compulsion was part of the picture.
CONCLUSION
When it comes to the question of the proper role for counsel in the police
interrogation environment, we are not writing on a clean slate. Miranda created
a chimera that serves neither the vast majority of suspects who are interrogated
nor the integrity of the criminal justice system in holding out a false promise.
Any proposal that actually provides attorneys for the approximately eighty
percent of suspects who choose to talk with the police without invoking the
magical words that will cut off questioning can only be an advantage to those
who believe, as did the original Miranda Court, that attorneys do make the
process fairer. Miranda recognized that its solution to the problem of the
inherent pressure of the police-dominated interrogation process was not the only
possibility and left it open for the states to experiment.165 The proposal outlined

164

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
Id. at 490 (finding that both “Congress and the states are free to develop their own
safeguards for the privilege”).
165

1156

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 97:1129

here is a way to move the interrogation regime toward a role for defense counsel
that comes closer to that envisioned by the majority in Miranda.

